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To engage with the world—to understand the scene in front of us,
plan actions, and predict what will happen next—wemust have an
intuitive grasp of the world’s physical structure and dynamics.
How do the objects in front of us rest on and support each other,
how much force would be required to move them, and how will
they behave when they fall, roll, or collide? Despite the centrality
of physical inferences in daily life, little is known about the brain
mechanisms recruited to interpret the physical structure of a scene
and predict how physical events will unfold. Here, in a series of
fMRI experiments, we identified a set of cortical regions that are
selectively engaged when people watch and predict the unfolding
of physical events—a “physics engine” in the brain. These brain
regions are selective to physical inferences relative to nonphysical
but otherwise highly similar scenes and tasks. However, these
regions are not exclusively engaged in physical inferences per se
or, indeed, even in scene understanding; they overlap with the
domain-general “multiple demand” system, especially the parts
of that system involved in action planning and tool use, pointing
to a close relationship between the cognitive and neural mecha-
nisms involved in parsing the physical content of a scene and pre-
paring an appropriate action.
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Understanding, predicting, and acting on the world requiresan intuitive grasp of physics (Fig. 1). We see not just a table and
a coffee cup, but a table supporting a coffee cup. We see not just a
ping pong ball moving after contact with a paddle, but the paddle
causing the ball to move by exerting a force through that contact. We
use physical intuitions to not just understand the world but predict
what will happen next—that a stack of dishes is unstable and likely to
fall or that a squash ball is on a trajectory to ricochet off the wall and
head in our direction. We also need rich physical knowledge to plan
our own actions. Before we pick up an object, we must assess its
material and weight and prepare our muscles accordingly. To navi-
gate our environment, we need to determine which surfaces will
support us (e.g., a linoleum floor but maybe not the surface of a
frozen stream; this tree branch but probably not that one) and what
barriers are penetrable (e.g., a beaded curtain but not a glass wall).
How do we compute these everyday physical inferences with such
apparent ease and speed?
Battaglia et al. (1) recently proposed a computational mechanism
for how humans can make a wide range of physical inferences in
natural scenes via a mental simulation engine akin to the “physics
engines” used in many video games. Physics engines are software
systems that support efficient but approximate simulations of rigid
body, soft body, or fluid mechanics for the purpose of generating
realistic interactive gameplay in a virtual physical world. Rather than
striving for fine-grained physical accuracy, game physics engines
make shortcuts to capture dynamic interactions that “look good” to
people over a wide range of situations and that can be generated in
real time, often exploiting specialized hardware acceleration [such
as graphics processing units (GPUs)]. Here, we ask: does the human
brain possess an analogous “intuitive physics engine”—a brain
region or family of regions essentially engaged in physical in-
ferences and recruited more for physical inference than for
other similarly difficult prediction or perception tasks?
Although some studies have explored the neural representation
of objects’ surface and material properties (2–4) and weights (5–7)
or investigated the brain areas involved in explicit, textbook-style
physical reasoning (8, 9), little is known about the cortical ma-
chinery that supports the more implicit perceptual judgments about
physical events that are so pervasive in daily life. However, behav-
ioral findings from young children and adults suggest that we use
systematic cognitive and neural machinery to make physical infer-
ences. During the first year of life, infants acquire a rich array of
physical knowledge in a consistent order; 3- to 4-mo-old infants
understand that the world is composed of bounded, unitary objects
(10) that are continuous in time and space (11). By 5 mo of age,
most infants are able to differentiate a liquid from a solid using
motion cues and have expectations about how nonsolids behave and
interact (12, 13); by 6 or 7 mo, they are sensitive to the causal roles
of one object striking and launching another (14, 15), and by 8 mo,
they can determine which objects must be attached for a configu-
ration to be stable under gravity (16). By 12 mo, they are sensitive to
the rough location of an object’s center of mass, relative to the edge
of a supporting surface, needed for that support relationship to be
stable (17). These findings and other behavioral findings from
young children suggest that humans may possess, from a young
age, a mental framework for interpreting and learning about
physical events (18, 19).
Although infant research has long emphasized the development
of basic competences entailed in implicit physical understanding
of simple scenes, early research on physical intuitions in adults
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used explicit, deliberate reasoning tasks and emphasized people’s
shortcomings relative to scientific norms. For example, when
asked to diagram the path that a moving object will follow, people
display systematic fallacies, sometimes drawing a curvilinear path
for an object moving in the absence of external forces if it was
previously moving in a rotational fashion (20) or drawing a straight
path for an object falling toward the ground, even if it had forward
momentum before being dropped (21, 22). More recent work,
however, has focused on more implicit perceptual or action-based
physical inference tasks of the kind that are critical in daily life,
and these studies reveal that people can make sophisticated
physical predictions if their intuitions are tested in this way. For
example, misjudgments of a dropped object’s path disappear if
people act to catch the object rather than simply drawing its path
(23). Indeed, many human judgments in perceptual tasks have been
found to be quantitatively consistent with approximate probabilistic
versions of Newtonian principles of motion (1, 24, 25). What neural
resources do humans use to perform these inferences?
Here, we asked whether the brain has a physics engine—a brain
region or set of regions, consistent across individuals, that imple-
ments fast intuitive physical inference from visually presented
scenes. Three broad possible findings merit consideration. First, it
is possible that no brain region is preferentially engaged in making
physical inferences compared with other object or scene perception
tasks matched on difficulty and visual content. Not all cognitive
functions engage brain regions specialized for that function; in-
deed, many tasks rely on domain-general brain resources (26, 27),
and physical inference may fall in this category. Second, physical
scene understanding could rely on a domain-specific system spe-
cialized for this function in particular, analogous to specialized
cortical systems identified for seeing faces (28), hearing speech
(29), or thinking about other people’s thoughts (30). Third, physical
inference may engage brain regions also known to be involved in
other functions, such as high-level vision (given the rich physical
information included in visual scene understanding) or motor
control (given the necessity of physical information for action
planning). This work will help determine the anatomical consis-
tency across individuals and functional specificity of the neural
machinery underlying physical inference and may provide ana-
tomical targets for future investigations of the dimensions of
physical information encoded and the computations used to ef-
ficiently parse the physical content of a scene.
Results
Experiment 1: Physical and Nonphysical Judgments with Visually
Identical Stimuli. In experiment 1, we screened broadly for candi-
date brain regions engaged in physical scene understanding by
asking which, if any, regions responded more when participants
judged the physical content of a stimulus than when they judged
other visual content of the same stimulus. We used a variant of the
block towers task in the work by Battaglia et al. (1): during
scanning, participants viewed videos of unstable block towers and
judged either where the blocks would land if the tower tumbled
(physical judgment) or whether the tower contained more blue or
yellow blocks (color judgment) (Fig. 2A). Critically, the stimuli
presented for the two tasks were visually identical, and the tasks
were matched on difficulty (Materials and Methods). Twelve par-
ticipants each completed two runs of the task. We used one-half of
the data from each subject (second run) to identify candidate
functional regions of interest (fROIs) that showed a stronger re-
sponse to the physics task than the color task. Specifically, we used
the group-constrained subject-specific region of interest (ROI)
definition method (31, 32). This approach identified regions
(“parcels”) of the cortex where many subjects had overlapping
activations in the physics > color contrast, reflecting neighbor-
hoods of common activation across subjects (Fig. 2B). For each
individual subject, we then defined subject-specific fROIs by
finding the subject’s significant voxels within each of the group
parcels. In this way, fROI locations were allowed to vary across
individuals but required to fall within the same parcel to be la-
beled as a common ROI across subjects. This approach provided
an objective and automatic means of localizing individual subject
fROIs and establishing a common fROI labeling scheme across
subjects without requiring voxelwise overlap in activations across
subjects (additional details are in Materials and Methods). Sub-
sequent analyses were performed within the fROIs defined in-
dividually within each subject. This approach yielded 11 distinct
cortical parcels, most of which appeared in bilateral pairs. (Sub-
cortical structures and the cerebellum were also included in the
parcel generation process, but no consistent group activity
appeared in those areas.) We labeled the parcels P1–P6 with an L
or R hemisphere designation but analyzed all 11 parcels separately
in subsequent analyses.
We validated and quantified the physics-related responses in
the 11 parcels using the independent, left-out data from each
subject’s first run, which provides a statistically unbiased measure
of the response magnitude of each region in each condition.
Time courses for three example fROIs are shown in Fig. 2C, and
response magnitudes (Fig. 2D) show a robust response for each
fROI in the physics task but little response to the color task,
despite the fact that the exact same stimuli were presented for
the two conditions; only the task is driving the difference. Re-
sponses were significantly greater for the physics task than the
color task in each fROI (Fig. 2). These 11 fROIs, thus, become
candidates for brain regions engaged preferentially in physical
inference, worthy of additional investigation.
Fig. 2E shows a random effects group activation map for the
same contrast using all data (two runs from each subject). Sig-
nificant voxels in the group random effects analysis generally fall
Fig. 1. Our experience of the world is shaped by our physical intuitions.
(A) When carrying out an everyday task, like shopping for produce, we “see”
which items can be safely removed from a pile without causing others to fall
and which cannot. (B) When we encounter a heavy door, we know that
pushing at the edge will be more effective in turning the door than pushing
near the center. We are also aware of the family of possible physical out-
comes of a scenario, and we form expectations about how likely different
classes of outcomes are; for example, the laptop’s position in C appears
perilous, because there is a good chance that the laptop will eventually end
up in the water or on the ground. However, the laptop’s position in D causes
little concern, despite the fact that it also rests near a large volume of water.
We form these intuitions with apparent ease, and they constrain and in-
teract with our goals (like choosing the perfect piece of fruit or keeping the
laptop unharmed) to determine the actions that we take next.
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within the parcels identified in the main (parcel-based) analysis
but not always vice versa. Indeed, a major strength of the parcel-
based method is that it can detect activations (e.g., the fusiform
face area) that are present in nearby regions in most subjects but
that often do not reach significance in a standard random effects
analysis because of insufficient overlap across subjects (31).
Another strength of the parcel-based method over the standard
group analysis method is that the former leaves some data out
for subsequent independent quantification of fROI responses,
whereas the latter method standardly does not.
Given the use of identical stimuli and a task matched for dif-
ficulty, there was no a priori guarantee that any brain regions
would respond more strongly in the physical inference task than in
the color judgment task. However, experiment 1 revealed a sys-
tematic set of regions that responds at least twice as strongly when
participants predict the physical outcome of a scenario than when
they judge visual information (color) in the identical scenario. No
difference in stimulus attributes could be responsible for the large
effects evident in Fig. 2D, but it remains possible that differences
in task content not related to physical reasoning per se drove the
larger responses to the physical task. The physical task required
mental simulation of what would happen next when the tower
tumbled, whereas the color task did not; a general process of
mental simulation (not specific to physical simulation) could be
driving responses in the candidate regions. In this respect, exper-
iment 1 is similar to a previous study that compared explicit
physical reasoning with social reasoning in the brain (9). That
study contrasted assessments of future physical outcomes with
assessments of present mental states, and as in experiment 1 here,
responses that they found could actually be because of prediction
more generally. Importantly, however, experiment 1 and our
subsequent tasks were designed to reflect the perceptual, action-
based nature of physical inference in daily life (for which humans
can be highly accurate), whereas the tasks used by Jack et al. (9)
were explicit physical reasoning problems more akin to those
studied by McCloskey et al. (20), for which observers show sys-
tematic errors. Similarly, another recent study by Mason and Just
(8) presented textbook-based physics concepts as a way to in-
vestigate the neural representation of abstract information that
must be learned through formal training. In contrast to these
studies, the tasks that we use here are designed to engage the kind
of intuitive physical inference that can be performed by preverbal
infants. The physical task in experiment 1 also demanded atten-
tion to the spatial locations of particular blocks, because the exact
arrangement determined how the blocks would fall. In the color
task, the positions of individual blocks were irrelevant. Thus,
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Fig. 2. Experiment 1 stimuli and results: physical vs. nonphysical judgments with
visually identical stimuli. (A) During scanning, participants viewed movies of
towers of blocks from the viewpoint of a camera panning around the tower.
On each block, subjects were cued to report either (i) where more blocks
would land (red vs. green side of the floor) if the tower tumbled or (ii)
whether there were more blue or yellow blocks in the tower, ignoring white
blocks. (B) Group parcels for the physics > color contrast computed using one
run per subject. (C) Mean PSC in the blood-oxygen level-dependent response
for three example parcels based on independent data from those used to
define parcels and fROIs. Gray shading indicates the time during which the
movies were shown, and pink shading indicates the response period during
which a blank black screen was shown. Two videos with the same task in-
struction were shown per block; time courses show the full duration of one
block. All fROIs showed a robust response during the physics task but little
response to the color task. D shows mean PSC for all parcels. Response to the
physics task was significantly greater than response to the color task in every
parcel (t11 = 4.16, 4.50, 5.52, 7.84, 7.40, 8.55, 8.48, 5.58, 5.14, 8.33, and 3.75;
P = 0.0016, 0.00091, 0.00018, 8 × 10−6, 1.4 × 10−5, 3 × 10−6, 4 × 10−6, 0.00017,
0.00032, 4 × 10−6, and 0.0032 for P1L, P1R, P2, P3L, P3R, P4L, P4R, P5L, P5R,
P6L, and P6R, respectively; paired t tests). Error bars in C and D are the
bootstrapped SE across subjects. *Significant at q = 0.05 after false discovery
rate correction for 11 comparisons. (E) Group random effects map for the
physics > color contrast based on all data (two runs per subject).
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attention to spatial content could also be contributing to responses
in the candidate regions. We, therefore, conducted a second ex-
periment to control for these task differences.
Experiment 2: Physical vs. Social Interactions. In experiment 2,
subjects watched pairs of dots moving within a square arena, with
motion that implied either social interaction [like the classic ani-
mations by Heider and Simmel (33)] or physical interaction
(bouncing like billiard balls) (Fig. 3A). In both cases, the dots
moved within the arena for 8 s; then, one dot became invisible but
remained within the arena, moving and interacting with the other
dot for the final 2 s of the video. Participants were asked to predict
the continuing trajectory of the now-invisible dot. On the final
movie frame, when the dot reappeared, participants reported
whether it had reappeared in an appropriate location. As in ex-
periment 1, the judgments for the two movie types were matched
on difficulty (Materials and Methods). Experiment 2 provided a
complementary case to experiment 1: both the physical and social
conditions used the same task, requiring mental simulation of
spatial paths, but one implicitly invoked physical prediction and
the other implicitly invoked social prediction.
Fig. 3B shows time courses of response for the physical and
social tasks for the same fROIs shown in Fig. 2C. Example parcels
P1R and P3R show a robust response timed to the onset of each of
the two movies in the block for the physical motion and a sub-
stantially smaller and delayed response to the social interaction
condition. By contrast, in P5R, the signal change was larger for the
social condition than the physical condition. These effects are
quantified in Fig. 3C, which shows the average response magnitude
within each of the 11 parcels. Five parcels showed significantly
greater response to the physical condition than the social condi-
tion: bilateral parcels in dorsal premotor cortex and supplementary
motor area (P1L and P1R) and bilateral parcels in parietal cortex
situated in somatosensory association cortex and the superior pa-
rietal lobule (P3L and P3R) as well as the left supramarginal
gyrus (P4L). As in experiment 1, a random effects group contrast
revealed significant voxels in the locations of these parcels
(Fig. 3D) but may underestimate the extent of the cortex en-
gaged by the task because of anatomical variability across subjects.
Importantly, the social condition in experiment 2 was not de-
void of physical content; for example, the dots could not pass
through walls or each other, and momentum was implied in the
smooth motion. Even a region that was perfectly selective for
physical inference (hence, not responsive to social content) would
still be expected to respond somewhat to the social condition in
experiment 2 because of this physical content. Indeed, we did see
reliable responses to the social condition (compared with baseline)
in all fROIs, especially during the simulation phase, but critically,
responses to the physics condition were significantly greater than
responses to the social condition in the five fROIs listed above,
implicating them in the processing of physical information. The
remaining fROIs showed robust responses to both conditions;
these areas may perform general prediction or spatial functions
that are necessary for the task in both conditions. Parcel P5R,
which falls near cortical areas implicated in biological motion
perception (34), showed a significantly greater response to the
social condition than the physical condition. This finding shows
that our design had sufficient power to uncover preferential re-
sponses to the social condition in expected regions.
The combined results of experiments 1 and 2 isolated five
candidate regions that respond to physical content in both task
and stimulus manipulations. The timing of the physics-related
responses in experiment 2 also provides a clue to the compo-
nents of the task that most effectively drive responses in these
regions. The signal increased during the observation periods of the
two physical videos in each block (gray shaded periods in Fig. 3B),
when subjects were viewing the motion and collisions of the
dots (allowing for standard hemodynamic lag). The signal did not
increase appreciably after the physical prediction periods (shaded in
pink in Fig. 3B), in which subjects actually had to mentally simulate
the behavior of the hidden dot. Thus, it may be that these candidate
regions can be engaged simply by the observation of physical con-
tent, even in the absence of the conscious, explicit effort to predict
how physical events will unfold. Although the responses to the so-
cial condition were significantly smaller than those to the physical
condition overall, the social condition did show an increase in re-
sponse late in the observation period and during the simulation
period. This delayed response may be because of participants using
some physical constraints to predict the future behavior of the dots
after inferring their social goals (e.g., observing that the red dot is
chasing the blue dot and formulating a prediction that includes
physical constraints, such as “the red dot will move in the direction
of the blue dot, avoiding the barrier in the center of the arena”).
If the observation of physical interactions drives responses in these
candidate regions, this crucial role of observation might explain why
our findings differ from those of a previous study that failed to find
brain regions that were preferentially recruited for judging physical
causality vs. social causality (35). Here, we used much longer ob-
servation periods, which allowed subjects to track physical behavior
over the course of several seconds. To test the possibility that ob-
servation of physical events alone is sufficient to drive responses in
the areas that we uncovered, we turned to an experiment in which
subjects passively viewed movies that contained rich physical content.
Experiment 3: Passive Viewing of Physical Events. The results of ex-
periment 2 suggest that simply observing physical events, such as
objects colliding, falling, or rolling, may be sufficient to engage the
brain’s physics engine. To test whether passive viewing of physical
events elicits responses in the candidate regions uncovered in ex-
periments 1 and 2, we conducted a new analysis on a large dataset
that had been collected previously [the results of which were pub-
lished in the work by Julian et al. (31)]. The experiment was orig-
inally designed as a localizer for face-, object-, scene-, and
body-selective cortical areas using passively viewed 3-s video clips
(Fig. 4A). We posited that, if the perceived physical content of the
movies differed across categories, these differences might be reflected
in the degree to which viewing them engages the same regions
identified in experiments 1 and 2 if passive viewing of physical
stimulus content is sufficient to drive responses in those regions.
We first collected ratings of the physical content in the movies
from 30 workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) (Materials
and Methods). Fig. 4A shows the physical content rating for each
of five categories ordered from highest to lowest. Statistically re-
liable differences were found between categories (F4,295 = 127.95;
P = 3.37 × 10−63; one-way ANOVA), with object movies showing
the highest physical content ratings. Furthermore, object movies
were rated significantly higher than scrambled objects (t118 = 9.48;
P = 3.4 × 10−16; two-sample t test), showing that, although the
scrambling procedure maintained the low-level visual content and
motion of the original movies, it diminished the ability to perceive
physical interactions within those movies. To test whether the
physical content in the passively viewed object movies engaged
brain regions similar to the physics-responsive areas identified in
experiments 1 and 2, we, therefore, examined the contrast of
objects > scrambled objects in the fMRI data. Note that this
contrast is also a standard localizer for object- and shape-selective
cortical regions and will reveal known areas that are selective for
those properties. Our questions here were whether the passively
viewed physical content in the dynamics of the object movies was
sufficient to engage additional regions beyond the classic object-
selective areas and whether any additional regions align with those
found in experiments 1 and 2. Using one-half of the data from
each subject (even runs), we identified group parcels and corre-
sponding individual subject fROIs for the objects > scrambled
objects contrast using the same group-constrained subject-specific
procedure as in experiment 1.
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Fig. 4B shows the group parcels identified by the objects >
scrambled objects contrast. In addition to parcels that fell in
expected object-selective locations in visual cortex and along the
ventral temporal surface, five additional parcels (highlighted in
blue in Fig. 4B) appeared in locations that overlapped sub-
stantially with the candidate physics-responsive regions that we
found in experiments 1 and 2. To characterize the response across
all five stimulus categories within these parcels, we examined the
signal change within the independent, left-out data (odd runs).
The signal change in these parcels for the five stimulus categories
corresponded closely to the independently collected ratings of
physical content, falling in exactly the same order in three of five
parcels. Thus, within the candidate physics-responsive parcels, the
level of fMRI response to passively viewed movies is well-pre-
dicted by the richness of the physical content in those movies. In
addition to the object movies, the body movies elicited strong
positive responses across the candidate physics regions, which
might be expected given that physical constraints factor critically
into computational models for planning body movements (36),
and similar networks have been suggested as the neural substrate
of a physically integrated body schema (37).
These results show that the conscious, explicit effort to men-
tally simulate the physical behavior of the objects in a scene is
not required to robustly engage these regions. However, these
findings do not imply that physical scene processing necessarily
happens automatically all of the time, irrespective of a person’s
goals or attentional state. Indeed, in experiment 1, selectively
attending to the tower’s color and ignoring its physical stability
eliminated responses in the candidate physics-responsive re-
gions. Although passive viewing of physical scenarios is sufficient
to engage the brain’s physics engine, a demanding competing
task may be able to draw resources away, such that physical scene
content is processed less deeply or automatically. The results of
experiment 4 also do not imply that these brain areas do not play
a key role in the mental simulation of physical outcomes, but
they may do so in an online and automatic fashion, generating
expectations that guide behavior as the events in a scene unfold.
Experiment 4: Relationship to the Multiple Demand Network and
Motor Planning. The previous experiments used difficulty-matched
tasks (or in the case of experiment 3, no task at all). The fact that
the same set of physics-responsive regions emerged consistently in
these difficulty-controlled experiments indicates that it is not just
general mental effort driving the responses in these regions. Still, it
could be the case that intuitive physical inference is carried out by
strictly the same domain-general cortical regions that contribute to
a wide variety of tasks, termed the multiple demand (MD) network
(38). Responses in the MD areas generally scale with task difficulty,
and this network is thought to provide a flexible problem-solving
framework that contributes to general intelligence (38). To test
whether the physics-responsive areas identified in the first three
experiments are the same as the MD network, we separately lo-
calized the MD network in the same 12 subjects who participated in
the first two experiments. During scanning, these subjects per-
formed spatial working memory and verbal working memory tasks
based on those in the work by Fedorenko et al. (27), which
contrasted hard (high-load) vs. easy (low-load) conditions (task
details are in Fig. S1). Fig. 5A shows the pattern of response for
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Fig. 3. Experiment 2 stimuli and results: physical vs. social interactions.
(A) During scanning, participants viewed 10-s movies of dots moving around
arenas. The motion of the dots indicated either physical interactions or social
interactions, and in each case, the participant imagined where one of the
dots would travel during a 2-s period when it was invisible. (B) Mean per-
centage change in the blood-oxygen level-dependent signal over the course
of a block for three example parcels. Data were analyzed within the same
individual subject ROIs defined in experiment 1. Two videos with the same
task instruction were shown per block during seconds 1–10 and 14–23 of the
26-s block. (C) Only a subset of the parcels showed a stronger response during
viewing and imagining physical interactions vs. social interactions (t11 =
3.67, 5.57, 0.17, 4.18, 2.98, 2.63, 0.31, 0.14, 3.48, 2.07, and 2.02; P = 0.0037,
0.0002, 0.87, 0.0015, 0.012, 0.023, 0.76, 0.89, 0.0052, 0.063, and 0.069 for
P1L, P1R, P2, P3L, P3R, P4L, P4R, P5L, P5R, P6L, and P6R, respectively; paired
t tests). *Significant at q = 0.05 after false discovery rate correction for 11
comparisons. (D) Group random effects map for the physical interactions >
social interactions contrast. Note the significant social responses in
expected areas along the superior temporal sulcus.
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each task in the hard > easy contrast. The two tasks showed a
highly similar pattern of difficulty modulation across the brain,
despite the differences in stimulus content, reflecting the pre-
viously described domain generality of the MD network (38). This
pattern of response overlaps substantially with the areas that we
have found to be engaged by physical inference (44.7 ± 6.0% of
the voxels in the physical inference ROIs showed significant re-
sponses in both the spatial working memory and verbal working
memory contrasts) but also, seems to include additional cortical
areas that were not physics-responsive in our experiments. To test
the similarity of MD network responses and intuitive physics-re-
lated responses (that is, whether they are likely to engage identical
sets of areas, allowing for some noise), we computed the corre-
lation between the whole-brain working memory and physical in-
ference maps and compared the strength of this correlation with
the correlation between the maps for the two working memory
tasks and the correlation between the maps for the two physical
inference tasks from experiments 1 and 2 (Materials and Methods).
Fig. 5B shows these correlations: although we found a significant
correlation between the spatial pattern of activation for the physics
tasks and the working memory tasks (t11 = 5.13; P = 0.00033; one-
sample t test), the activation pattern was more similar between the
two working memory tasks (t11 = 2.87; P = 0.015; paired t test) and
between the two physics tasks (t11 = 3.04; P = 0.011; paired t test).
This pattern of results indicates that the physical inference-related
activations and the MD activations are similar to each other but
also, significantly different from each other.
More specifically, the physics-responsive regions seem to sit
within a subset of the MD network. What distinguishes this
subset from the rest of the MD network? Fig. 5C shows group
parcels for the MD network generated based on the hard > easy
contrasts from the spatial and verbal working memory tasks. The
parcels are colored to reflect the magnitude of the towers > color
contrast from experiment 1. The subset of the MD network most
strongly engaged by physical inference resembles the brain
regions discussed in the literatures on motor planning (39–43) and
tool use (44–46) [figure 1 in the work by Gallivan and Culham
(40) shows a meta-analysis]. This overlap points to the intriguing
possibility of shared functional neuroanatomy for physical scene
understanding and action planning. However, despite the ap-
parent overlap among brain regions previously implicated in
multiple demands, motor planning, and tool use, these litera-
tures rarely engage with each other and use different experi-
mental paradigms in distinct groups of subjects. As a consequence,
it is difficult to determine whether these literatures refer to the
same underlying neural system, and there is no straightforward
way to determine with which system (if they are, indeed, distinct)
the physical inference regions that we find are most closely asso-
ciated. To do so will require running multiple paradigms from all
three literatures in addition to physical inference paradigms within
the same subjects, a substantial undertaking. At present, we simply
note the striking overlap of physics-responsive regions and motor
planning/tool use regions and the intriguing possibility that phys-
ical inference and motor function are intimately linked in the brain.
Discussion
This study found that physical scene understanding engages a
systematic set of brain regions replicated across three studies: one
holding the stimulus constant and varying the task (a tower-falling
task vs. a color judgment task), one holding the task constant
(“what will happen next?”) and varying the stimuli (which had
physical vs. social content), and one contrasting passive viewing of
engaging movies that contained extensive physical content (e.g.,
colliding objects) vs. nonphysical content (e.g., faces). This sys-
tematic pattern of activation across all three tasks includes bi-
lateral frontal regions (dorsal premotor cortex/supplementary
motor area), bilateral parietal regions (somatosensory association
cortex/superior parietal lobule), and the left supramarginal gyrus.
This pattern of activation cannot be explained by generic
task demands (because difficulty was matched across conditions),
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Fig. 4. Experiment 3 results: passive viewing of physical events. (A) We analyzed existing data from an experiment in which 65 participants passively viewed 3-s
video clips containing objects, bodies, scrambled objects, scenes, and faces. We separately obtained ratings from 30 workers on AMT who rated the degree of
physical content in the movies on a scale from one (least physical content) to five (most physical content) (Materials and Methods). Bars show the mean physical
content rating for each of five categories; error bars are ±SE across subjects. (B) Group parcels generated based on an objects > scrambled objects contrast in one-
half of the data from each subject (runs 2 and 4). Five parcels, highlighted in blue, overlapped substantially with physics-responsive parcels identified in ex-
periments 1 and 2. (C) PSC plots for five highlighted parcels computed from data in independent runs (runs 1 and 3). The signal change in these parcels for five
stimulus categories corresponded closely to the independently collected ratings of physical content, with objects receiving the highest physical content ratings and
producing the largest signal change and faces receiving the lowest physical content ratings and producing the smallest signal change. Thus, within the candidate
physics-responsive parcels, the level of blood-oxygen level-dependent response to passively viewed stimuli is well-predicted by the physical content in the stimuli.
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inherent interest (because the opposite contrast produced extensive
activations in each case), or the spatial content of the physical tasks
(which were matched in experiment 2). Neither can this pattern of
response be explained by differential eye movements between con-
ditions: within the candidate physical inference regions, the physics
tasks produced stronger responses than a saccade task designed to
elicit maximal eye movement-related responses (Figs. S2 and S3).
Instead, this pattern of activation seems to reflect the process of
physical scene understanding itself, which generalizes robustly across
three tasks, each engaging different aspects of physical inference.
Although our data argue against the possibility that physical scene
understanding is carried out by a purely domain-specific system, they
also reject the possibility that physical inference is achieved by
completely domain-general mechanisms (physical and nonphysical
tasks were matched in difficulty, but we still found regions that were
preferentially engaged by physical tasks). Instead, we find evidence
for the third possible outcome proposed in the Introduction: brain
regions exist that are preferentially engaged by physical inference
over and above other similar and equally demanding scene un-
derstanding tasks (a physics engine in the brain), those regions are
systematic across subjects, and they overlap with areas to which other
functions have been previously attributed (namely motor action
planning, tool use, and general problem-solving).
Does it make sense to talk about “the brain’s physics engine” if
these same regions are also engaged in other planning and problem-
solving tasks? Consider an analogy with the GPUs that are now
integrated into many computers. The highly parallel architecture of
GPUs was originally motivated by the demands of graphics-
intensive computing applications, but GPUs have since become in-
dispensable for other applications, such as computer vision, deep
neural network training, and indeed, real-time approximate physics
simulation in computer games. An examination of the resource use
of a computer would find that the GPU is active during all of these
tasks and others that share similar computational demands. Thus,
the same GPU hardware can serve as a physics engine, a graphics
engine, a computer vision engine, and so forth—although it is not
engaged by many other software applications, such as databases,
word processors, or spreadsheets; it is not a completely general
system, and it is not especially engaged in memory- or language-
intensive processing. We propose that this analogy extends to the
network of brain areas reported here, which are active for a set of
tasks that shares similar computational demands and serves as a
physics engine in the context of physically rich visual input or
task demands.
What are those shared computational demands underlying
physical inference, motor planning, and tool use that might lead
to shared cortical systems? One possibility is that the ability to
plan actions presumes a physical model of the world. Applying
the correct force when grasping an object requires knowledge of
the object’s weight, its slipperiness, how much it will deform
when grasped, etc. Clinical findings support this idea. Patients
with acquired deficits in the ability to use familiar tools (apraxia)
are sometimes also impaired in the ability to infer how a novel
tool can be used based on its structure (essentially, an intuitive
physics task) (47, 48). The loci of brain damage in such patients
closely resemble the family of regions that we find to be engaged
in physical inference. A second possible reason for the apparent
overlap of physical inference activations with action planning/
tool use regions is that we learn about the physical environment
through interaction with it; learning about causality in infants is
accelerated when they are enabled to engage in causal inter-
ventions at a younger age (49). Although it may be that physical
inference necessarily involves some degree of covert action or
motor imagery, we strove to minimize the motivation for motor
imagery in experiments 2 and 3. Indeed, we saw the same set of
action planning regions engaged when participants viewed highly
simplified stimuli that had no 3D cues indicating how to interact
with them (experiment 2) and when participants passively viewed
movies and no action or judgment was required (experiment 3).
Thus, a mental physics engine may be built into our brain’s
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Fig. 5. Experiment 4 results: the relationship between physics-responsive brain regions and the MD network. (A) Group random effects (RFX) maps for the
hard > easy contrast in the spatial working memory (spatial WM) and verbal working memory (verbal WM) tasks (task details are in Fig. S1). Voxels shown in
the group RFX maps are significant after false discovery rate (FDR) correction at q = 0.05. (B) Correlation of the whole-brain pattern of blood-oxygen level-
dependent response between pairs of tasks expressed as a proportion of the maximum possible correlation (Materials and Methods). Patterns of response for
the spatial working memory and verbal working memory tasks were significantly more strongly correlated with each other than with the physics tasks.
Likewise, patterns of response for the towers task and the dots task were significantly more strongly correlated with each other than with the working
memory tasks. (C) Group parcels generated based on a hard > easy contrast in the spatial working memory and verbal working memory tasks shown for the
left hemisphere. Parcels were generated by taking the intersection of the significant voxels for the two tasks within each subject using one-half of the data
from each subject (run 2). The color of each parcel reflects the magnitude of the experiment 1 towers > color contrast within that parcel.
E5078 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1610344113 Fischer et al.
action planning system (because action planning requires phys-
ical inference), but after we have this system in place, we may use
it even when no action planning occurs.
Similar regions in premotor and parietal cortices have been
shown to be engaged in spatial and temporal pattern prediction (50,
51) [in particular, in temporal order processing for abstract se-
quences (52)]. These abstract spatiotemporal predictions may be
the building blocks on which the online mental simulation of
physical interactions is built. As posited by Schubotz (50), the same
motor circuits that calibrate our actions based on their predicted
consequences (relying on feedback loops for online updating as an
action unfolds) may be well-suited to performing online prediction
of physical events, even in the absence of an action. The fact that
physical inference may be rooted in an online updating mechanism
agrees with the results of our experiments 2 and 3, where the action
planning system was engaged simply by watching the physical events
in a scene unfold. Importantly, however, our results argue against
the idea that these regions are equally engaged in all types of spa-
tiotemporal prediction—in experiment 2, we found that, even for
difficulty-matched tasks that both involved spatial and temporal
extrapolation of moving objects, the rules governing the motion
(physical vs. social) significantly modulated the engagement of
premotor and parietal cortices.
We have tested only a small subset of the full space of intuitive
physical scene understanding. In daily life, we observe and predict
not just the motions of rigid objects but also, the flow of fluids, the
behavior of springs and pendulums, and the behavior of deformable
objects, like ropes and cloth. Whether the observation and pre-
diction of physical behaviors for these types of scenarios recruit the
same brain regions that we found here remains to be seen, and the
answer will speak to the scope and nature of the computations
carried out in these regions. On one hand, all objects and materials
are subject to the same physical laws and may be simulated by the
same circuits that implement those laws. On the other hand, the
actual behaviors of objects vary wildly depending on their particular
properties—computationally effective procedures for simulating or
judging collisions of rigid bodies do not apply at all for collisions of
soft bodies. If the brain regions that we have uncovered for intuitive
physical inference implement computations more like the simula-
tion procedures of game physics engines [as hypothesized by
Battaglia et al. (1)], rather than a set of universal physical laws, then
we might expect to see activation patterns that vary with object or
material type. Testing a broad range of intuitive physical inference
tasks will be essential for understanding the function of each region
and building models of how physical scene understanding is carried
out in the brain.
This work opens up a broad landscape of new questions. Do the
brain regions reported here explicitly code for physical properties,
such as masses, forces, or materials? Do they code for events, such
as collisions, falling, rolling, or sticking together? Do they in-
terface with scene-selective cortical areas to establish a reference
frame for physical predictions (53)? Some studies have found that
premotor cortex encodes information about objects’ weights (6, 7),
but participants in these studies planned reaching movements to
objects, where weight information is a necessary component of
the motor plan to apply the correct force. It remains unknown
whether the same regions represent mass and other physical
properties in the absence of an intended action. Answering these
questions may require examining how the multivariate pattern of
response changes as a function of the physical content in a scene.
Future work should also test the causal role of these regions in
physical inference (for example, by intervening in the activity in
these regions with transcranial magnetic stimulation). These
studies and others can be expected to shed important new light on
the fundamental everyday activity of physical scene understanding,
its brain basis, and the computations that it entails.
Materials and Methods
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Institutional Review Boards
approved all experimental protocols. All participants provided informed
consent before their participation.
fMRI Data Collection and Preprocessing. fMRI data collection was conducted at
the Athinoula A. Martinos Imaging Center at MIT on a Siemens 3T MAG-
NETOM Tim Trio Scanner (Siemens AG Healthcare) with a 32-channel head
coil. A high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical image (MPRAGE) was col-
lected for each subject [repetition time (TR) = 2.53 s; echo time (TE) = 1.64,
3.5, 5.36, and 7.22 ms; flip angle-α = 7°; field of view (FOV) = 256 mm; matrix =
256 × 256; slice thickness = 1 mm; 176 slices; acceleration factor = 3; 32 ref-
erence lines]. Functional data were collected using a T2*-weighted echo planar
imaging pulse sequence (TR = 2 s; TE = 30 ms; α = 90°; FOV = 200 mm; matrix =
64 × 64; slice thickness = 3 mm; slice gap = 0.6 mm; 32 slices), which afforded
whole-brain coverage.
Data preprocessing and general linear models were performed using a
combination of BrainVoyager QX (Brain Innovation B.V.) and the FsFast tools
in the FreeSurfer Software Suite (freesurfer.net). Surface visualizations were
generated in BrainVoyager QX. All other analyses were conducted in Matlab
R2012b (The MathWorks). Preprocessing consisted of 3D motion correction,
slice scan time correction, high-pass filtering via a general linear model with
a Fourier basis set (cutoff of two cycles per run, which also achieved linear
trend removal), and spatial smoothing with a 4-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel.
Before spatial smoothing, the functional runs were individually coregistered
to the subject’s T1-weighted anatomical image. The data were transformed
to a standardized coordinate system (Talairach space) to allow for group-
level analyses. General linear models included 12 nuisance regressors based
on the motion estimates generated from the 3D motion correction: x, y, and
z translation; x, y, and z rotation; and the approximated first derivatives of
each of these motion estimates.
Experiment 1. Thirteen subjects (ages 18–26 y old; six female) participated in
the fMRI component of experiment 1. One participant was excluded (and
the data were not analyzed), because the participant was too tired to
complete the full experiment. All participants were right-handed and had
normal or corrected to normal vision; 40 workers on AMT participated in the
online portion of experiment 1. To participate in the task, AMT workers
were required to have completed at least 1,000 previous human intelligence
tasks (HITs) and have a 95% approval rating on previous HITs.
Stimuli and design. Stimuli for experiment 1 were based on those used by
Battaglia et al. (1), and they were created in Blender 2.70 (Blender Foundation;
https://www.blender.org). The stimuli were 6-s movies depicting stacks
(“towers”) of yellow, blue, and white blocks (Fig. 2A). The blocks were po-
sitioned so that the towers were unstable and would tumble if gravity was
allowed to take effect. The facts that the towers would collapse and exactly
how they would collapse were determined using rigid body physical simu-
lation carried out by the Bullet Physics Engine in Blender. Each tower was
positioned at the center of a circular floor; one-half of the floor was colored
green, whereas the other one-half of the floor was colored red. Over the
course of a 6-s movie, the camera viewpoint panned around the tower,
completing one 360° pan, which allowed observers to see the tower from a
range of vantage points. The tower itself was stationary within the scene.
While viewing each movie, subjects were instructed to perform one of two
tasks: (i) imagine how the blocks will fall and report whether more blocks
will come to rest on the red or green side of the floor or (ii) report whether
there are more blue or yellow blocks in the tower, ignoring any white blocks.
Each tower contained a minimum of 17 blocks, not all of which were visible at
a time, to discourage serial counting. Subjects were instructed to, instead,
evaluate the proportion of the two colors in the tower as a whole. Each tower
contained one or two more blocks of one color than the other, and some but
not all towers contained one or two white blocks. The difficulty of the two
tasks was matched based on data from AMT (SI Materials and Methods).
Each scanning run consisted of 23 18-s blocks: 10 blocks of the physical task,
10 blocks of the color task, and 3 rest blocks, which consisted of only a blank
black screen. Each nonrest block beganwith a text cue, displayed for 1s, which
read either “more blue or yellow?” (color task) or “where will it fall?”
(physical task). These cues were chosen to be similar in length and avoid
mention of color (which might prime attention to color) in the physical task
cue. The text cue was followed by the presentation of a tower movie (6 s)
and then, a black screen during a 2-s response period. This sequence was
repeated twice within a block, with the same task being cued for both movie
presentations within a block. Rest blocks occurred in blocks 1, 12, and 23,
and the nonrest blocks were arranged in a pseudorandom palindromic or-
der, so that the pairwise ordering between block types was balanced across
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a run. A scanning run lasted for 414 s (207 volumes with a 2-s TR). Each
subject participated in two runs collected in a random order.
Analysis. To identify group parcels and individual subject fROIs for the
physics > color contrast, we used the group-constrained subject-specific ROI
definition method (31, 32) on one-half of each subject’s data (the second run
that each subject completed). We thresholded individual subjects’ significance
maps at P < 0.01 uncorrected (an intentionally liberal threshold to facilitate
identifying areas of group overlap) and identified voxels where five or more
subjects showed significant activations. We then used a watershed algorithm
to subdivide the group overlap map into discrete parcels. Individual subject
fROIs were defined by intersecting the subject’s thresholded map with each
group-level parcel, and all subsequent analyses were performed in individual
subject fROIs using the group parcels as an identification system to indicate
corresponding ROIs across subjects.
Experiment 2. The same participants from the fMRI portion of experiment 1
participated in the fMRI portion of experiment 2. Additionally, 32AMTworkers
participated in the online portion of experiment 2; to qualify to participate,
workers were subject to the same criteria as in experiment 1.
Stimuli and design. The stimuli in experiment 2 were 10-s movies of red and blue
dots moving within a square arena (Fig. 3A). The movement of the dots was
dictated by either Newtonian mechanics for elastic collisions or social goals
assigned to the dots [in the style of the classic animations by Heider and
Simmel (33)]. SI Materials and Methods has details on the stimulus creation.
Our goal was for subjects to generate expectations for how the dots would
behave based on the physical or social behavior and then, predict how the
dots would behave during a mental simulation period. For one-half of the
movies in each set (balanced across the movies with barriers or no barriers), we
generated a version of the video in which one of the dots became invisible
during the last 2 s of the 10-s movie and became visible again on the final
frame of the movie. The invisible dot still interacted either socially or physically
with the other dot and the arena. These movies were labeled “correct”
movies, where the final position of the hidden dot, when it reappeared on the
last frame, was consistent with where it would have traveled given its behavior
before becoming invisible. We then generated a second set of movies, labeled
“incorrect” movies, where we displaced the final position of the hidden dot
when it reappeared, so that the final position was inconsistent with the be-
havior of the dot before its disappearance. A participant’s task when viewing
each movie was to observe the dot behavior, imagine how the hidden dot was
behaving during the 2 s when it was invisible, and then, report whether the
final position of the dot when it reappeared was correct or incorrect. We
matched the difficulty of the judgments for the social and physical movies
based on data collected from AMT (SI Materials and Methods).
Each scanning run consisted of 19 26-s blocks: 8 blocks containing physical
movies, 8 blocks containing social movies, and 3 rest blocks, which consisted
of only a blank black screen. Each nonrest block contained two movies of the
same type (physical or social). A block began with the presentation of a 10-s
movie, and when the movie was finished, the final frame stayed onscreen for
another 1.5 s (during which subjects decided whether the final dot position
was correct and made a response). A blank screen was displayed for 1.5 s
before the onset of the next movie. This sequence was repeated twice within
a block, amounting to a 26-s block in total. Rest blocks occurred in blocks 1, 10,
and 19, and the nonrest blocks were arranged in a palindromic order as in
experiment 1. A scanning run lasted for 494 s (247 volumes with a 2-s TR). Each
subject participated in two runs, collected in a random order.
Analysis. Data were preprocessed and aligned to each subject’s high-resolu-
tion anatomical image as in experiment 1. We analyzed the data within the
candidate physics-responsive regions obtained with the group-constrained
subject-specific method in experiment 1. Because the ROIs were defined
independently on the data from experiment 2, we used both of a subject’s
runs to generate the percentage signal change (PSC) plots shown in Fig. 3 B
and C. All other details of the analysis are identical to those in experiment 1.
Experiment 3. Sixty-five subjects participated in the fMRI component of ex-
periment 3. Data from a subset of these participants were previously pub-
lished in the work by Julian et al. (31). Additionally, 32 AMT workers
participated in the online portion of experiment 3; to qualify to participate,
workers were subject to the same criteria as in experiments 1 and 2.
Stimuli and design. Details of the stimuli and design of experiment 3 are
published in the work by Julian et al. (31) In brief, participants were pre-
sented with 3-s movie clips of faces, bodies, scenes, objects, and scrambled
objects. Face and body movies showed children playing in front of a black
background, scene movies showed various environments (mostly pastoral
scenes) passing by as the camera moved through them, and object movies
showed toys, such as balls or vehicles, in motion (e.g., spinning or rolling).
Scrambled objects movies were created by dividing each object movie into
a 15 × 15 grid and randomly rearranging the locations of the cells in the
grid. There were 60 movies in each category (300 movies total), and the
movies presented from each category during a run were randomly sampled
without replacement from the full set of available movies. Movie clips
were organized into blocks that contained six clips from the same category
(18-s blocks), and each scanning run contained two blocks from each cat-
egory. A run also included three 18-s rest blocks (blocks 1, 7, and 13),
during which a full-screen color was displayed, and the color changed
every 3 s. Subjects were simply instructed to watch the stimuli that
appeared onscreen. Each subject completed four 234-s runs of the exper-
iment. Acquisition parameters for fMRI data collection differed slightly
from those used in experiments 1 and 2 but still afforded full-brain cov-
erage (TR = 2,000 ms; TE = 30 ms; FOV = 192 × 192; matrix = 64 × 64;
32 slices; 3 × 3 × 3.6-mm voxel resolution). We obtained ratings of the
perceived physical content in the videos from each category from workers
on AMT (SI Materials and Methods).
Analysis. We identified group parcels and individual subject fROIs for the
objects > scrambled objects contrast using the same approach as in experi-
ment 1, using one-half of each subject’s data (runs 2 and 4). We used the
independent, left-out data from each subject (runs 1 and 3) to generate PSC
plots for five stimulus categories (Fig. 4C).
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SI Materials and Methods
Data Collection from Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Experiment 1. We began with an initial set of 150 movies of block
towers and had 40 workers on AMT make the physical and color
judgments described in Materials and Methods. Each worker
made judgments on the complete set of movies. The data from
three workers were excluded from additional analysis after it was
determined that they ignored the task instructions (two workers
provided the same response for all movies, and one provided
random responses). From the full set of movies, we selected a
subset of 40 that had the lowest within-movie difference in
percentage correct between the physical and color judgments
subject to counterbalancing constraint that the selected set
contained equal numbers of movies, in which the correct re-
sponses for the physical and color judgments were red, blue; red,
yellow; green, blue; and green; yellow. This set of 40 movies was
divided into sets for two functional runs, each adhering to the
same counterbalancing constraint. The accuracies within the
movies selected for each run were set 1: physical task, 83.8 ± 12.1
SD percentage correct; color task, 83.8 ± 13.8 SD percentage
correct; t(19) = 0 for a difference between tasks; P = 1; paired
t test and set 2: physical task, 87.0 ± 12.6 SD percentage correct;
color task, 86.4 ± 12.2 SD percentage correct; t(19) = 0.26 for a
difference between tasks; P = 0.79; paired t test. Each individual
movie appeared twice within a functional run: once with in-
structions to perform the physical task and once with instructions
to perform the color task. In this way, we equated the difficulty
of the physical simulation and color judgment tasks within each
functional run to minimize the possibility that any difference in
mental effort between the conditions could give rise to differ-
ences in the fMRI BOLD response.
Experiment 2.Tomatch the difficulty of the judgments for the social
and physical movies, we collected data from 32 workers on AMT.
Each worker performed the correct/incorrect position judgment
for all 80 movies and also, provided an “animacy” rating for each
movie. The instruction for the animacy rating was: “For each
movie, we will ask you how animated the circles looked—in
other words, to what extent did the circles look like they were
moving on their own as a person would vs. moving as an in-
animate billiard ball would?” AMT workers rated the animacy of
each movie on a scale from one (not alive) to five (strongly
appeared to be alive). The data from two workers were excluded
from additional analysis because of quality issues (one provided
the same response to nearly every movie and performed at
chance; the other consistently selected a response before seeing
the final ball position). The ratings confirmed a significant dif-
ference in the perceived animacy of the dots in the physical vs.
social movies [mean rating of 1.62 ± 0.25 SD for physical movies;
mean rating of 3.85 ± 0.45 SD for social movies; t(78) = 27.3; P =
10−42; two-sample t test]. From the original set of 80 movies, we
retained 64 movies, which allowed for a good match in per-
centage correct between the physical and social judgments.
These movies were divided into two runs of 32 movies each (16
physical and 16 social movies), with one-half of the movies in
each run containing barriers and the other one-half containing
no barriers. We also ensured that the dot that disappeared in
each movie was red or blue with equal frequency to discourage
preferential attention to one color. The accuracies within the
movies selected for each run were set 1: physical movies, 75.0 ±
18.4 SD percentage correct; social movies, 72.7 ± 16.7 SD per-
centage correct; t(30) = 0.38 for a difference between tasks; P =
0.71; two-sample t test and set 2: physical movies, 78.4 ± 18.1 SD
percentage correct; social movies, 78.1 ± 12.9 SD percentage
correct; t(30) = 0.047 for a difference between tasks; P = 0.96;
two-sample t test.
Experiment 3. To test for differences in the perceived physical
content among five categories, we collected ratings of the movies
from 32 workers on AMT. Workers viewed all 300 movies in a
random order and responded to the following question: “When
viewing the video, to what extent do you notice and focus on the
physical properties of the objects or people in the clip (for ex-
ample, their weight, texture, or hardness), and to what extent do
you notice and focus on the physical interactions between the
objects or people (for example, contact, collision, rolling, or
tumbling)?” Workers provided a response on a scale from one
(least physical content) to five (most physical content) for each
movie. In addition, workers performed a one-back task included
to monitor their attentiveness—they reported whether each movie
was identical to the movie that they had seen on the previous trial.
Of 32 workers who originally participated, one worker’s data were
excluded from additional analysis because of chance performance
on the one-back task, and a second worker’s data were excluded
for providing the same response on nearly every video. The
physical content ratings are reported in Fig. 4A.
Experiment 2 Stimulus Creation.Each dot in the physical and social
movies had a radius of 25 pixels, and the full arena was 200 × 200
pixels. Some arenas had gray barriers (rectangles) of various
sizes that the dots could not pass through. To generate movies
with physical behavior, we assigned starting positions and ve-
locities to the dots and then, computed their updated positions in
fine temporal increments. The updated 2D position P of a dot at
time t was given by
Pt+1 =Pt +Vt × dt,
where V was a dot’s 2D velocity vector, and dt was the temporal
sampling increment of the simulation (10−5). The change in V
caused by rolling friction was computed as
Vt+1 =Vt ×
1− μ0 × dtﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
V   2t,x +V   2t,y
q ,
where μ0 was a constant (μ0 = 500) determining the loss of
energy because of friction with the arena floor. A collision of a
dot with a wall or another dot similarly incurred an energy loss
given by
V ′t =Vt ×
1− μ1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
V   2t,x +V   2t,y
q ,
where μ1 = 1.5. A wall collision resulted in an inversion of the
appropriate x or y component of the velocity. When the two dots
collided with each other, they exchanged their velocities along
the normal line connecting their centers (implying equal masses
for the two dots). One frame for every 800 time steps was saved
to an image, and the resulting images were assembled into a 10-s
movie. The resulting movies resembled billiard balls or hockey
pucks bouncing within the arena.
To generate the movies with social behavior, we animated the
dot motion by hand. For each movie, we began with the same
barriers and starting positions as one of the physical movies and
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had in mind a simple narrative for the interaction of the dots (e.g.,
blue is chasing red, and red wants to hide in the corner). Using
custom Matlab scripts, we controlled the dots using a computer
trackpad and recorded their positions on a frame by frame basis.
The dots were not allowed to pass through walls, barriers, or each
other, and they were animated to generally avoid collisions so as
to reduce the physical content in the movies. Using this approach,
we generated 40 physical movies and 40 social movies that were
paired in terms of the arena arrangement and dot starting po-
sitions. One-half of the movies in each set had barriers positioned
within the arena, and one-half did not.
Bootstrapping and Statistics.Error bars for all plots were generated
using a bootstrapping approach. The effect of interest was first
computed within each subject. Then, on each of 10,000 bootstrap
iterations, the subjects in the group were sampled with re-
placement, and the group mean was computed on each iteration.
Error bars displayed are the SDs of the upper and lower halves
of the bootstrapped distribution (computed separately), which
correspond to the SEM.
PSC plots were generated by averaging the signal time course
across voxels in an ROI and then, extracting the time points for
the rest conditions. We used the mean signal from the last four
time points within the rest blocks as a baseline for computing PSC
(excluding earlier time points reduced the amount of signal
carryover from previous blocks that were included in the base-
line). We then computed PSC for the remaining time points by
dividing their intensity values by the baseline, multiplying by 100,
and subtracting 100. To plot the PSC for a condition, we collected
all of the blocks for that condition, averaged the PSC across
blocks within a subject, and computed error bars across subjects
using a bootstrapping method as described above. For signifi-
cance testing and displaying bar plots, we removed the first three
time points of the PSC time course (to accommodate the rise time
of the BOLD response after the onset of a block) and averaged
the PSC across the rest of the block. Error bars for bar plots were
computed across subjects with the same bootstrapping approach,
and significance testing for differences between bars was con-
ducted with a permutation analyses as described above.
MD Network Localizer. We identified the MD network (26, 38) in
the same subjects who participated in experiments 1 and 2 using
two working memory tasks adapted from the work by Fedorenko
et al. (27). Details of the tasks are provided in Fig. S1. First-level
analyses of the data were conducted in the same way as in ex-
periments 1 and 2. To compute the correlation between the
patterns of response for the physics tasks and the working
memory tasks, we split each subject’s data from each of the tasks
in half, generating BOLD response maps for each individual run
in each subject. The spatial and verbal working memory maps
(spatial_WM and verbal_WM, respectively) reflected a hard >
easy contrast, and the physics maps reflected a physics > color
contrast (experiment 1) and a physical > social contrast (ex-
periment 2). Because the negative responses in the physics
contrasts reflected different types of information by design and
would be expected to appear in different brain areas (e.g., color-re-
sponsive regions in experiment 1 and social processing regions in
experiment 2), we removed the negative responses from all maps and
performed correlations only on the positive responses. We estimated
the split-half reliability for the maps from each task by taking the two
maps for a given task within a subject (originating from two runs) and
computing the correlation between them. This within-task correlation
provided an estimate of the largest possible correlation that we could
expect when correlating one of the maps in the pair with a map
coming from a different task based on the amount of noise in the
individual maps. We then computed all of the pairwise correlations
among the individual run maps for spatial working memory, verbal
working memory, towers, and physical dots within each subject. We
normalized each of these pairwise correlations by the maximum
possible correlation for that pair given by the within-task correlations.
To combine the two within-task correlations for a pair into a single
estimate of the maximum possible correlation for the pair of tasks, we
used a Monte Carlo simulation. On each of 10,000 iterations, a ran-
dom signal of the same length as the fMRI data was generated to use
as a source signal. Multiple copies of the source signal were then
corrupted with varying amounts of noise, and we selected the ap-
propriate noise levels to produce the within-task correlations found
for the two tasks in the pair. We then computed the across-task
correlation, which gave the ceiling correlation used to normalize the
empirical correlation between the pair of tasks. Because the same
underlying source signal was used to generate the noise-corrupted
signals corresponding to the two tasks, the correlation between tasks
reflected the maximum possible correlation (i.e., the correlation if the
two tasks actually originated from the same underlying signal). Cor-
relations shown in Fig. 5B are the normalized correlations av-
eraged across runs (e.g., the spatial_WM↔verbal_WM
correlation is the average of spatial_WMrun_1↔verbal_WMrun_1,
spatial_WMrun_1↔verbal_WMrun_2, spatial_WMrun_2↔verbal_WMrun_1,
and spatial_WMrun_2↔verbal_WMrun_2).
To generate MD network parcels, we used the same process as
in experiment 1, except that we used the intersection of the
significant voxels from the spatial working memory hard > easy
contrast and the verbal working memory hard > easy contrast to
create each subject’s significance map, which then contributed to
the group overlap map.
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ahard: 8 cells easy: 4 cells
? ?
b
hard: 8 digits easy: 4 digits
three 1000 ms
250 ms blank
250 ms blank
250 ms blank
250 ms blank
two
zero two 1000 ms
six one 1000 ms
nine
3 2 0 2 6 1 9 7
3 2 0 2 1 6 9 7
3 2 0 2 6 1 9 7
3 2 0 2 1 6 9 7
0 2 1 9
0 2 9 1
seven 1000 ms
3500 ms
x 2
per block
500 ms blank
1000 ms
1000 ms
1000 ms
1000 ms
3000 ms
1000 ms blank
x 4
per block
Fig. S1. Spatial and verbal working memory tasks. We localized the MD network (26, 38) using two working memory tasks adapted from the work by
Fedorenko et al. (27). (A) Spatial working memory task. On each trial, participants saw a series of four 3 × 4 grids presented for 1 s each. In each grid, either
one or two of the cells were filled in blue (one cell per grid for the “easy” condition and two cells per grid for the “hard” condition). Participants had to
remember the locations of the filled cells. During a subsequent 3-s response period, two grids were displayed side by side; one contained the correct sum-
mation of the filled locations from the previous four grids, and one contained an incorrect arrangement generated by shifting one of the filled cells to an
incorrect location. Participants responded, indicating which of the grids contained the correct arrangement. A block comprised four trials of the same con-
dition (32-s blocks), and a run contained 12 blocks plus four 16-s rest periods (448 s per run). Each subject completed two runs of the task. (B) Verbal working
memory task. Participants saw four frames displayed for 1 s each, which contained written digits (one digit per frame for the easy condition and two digits per
frame for the hard condition). Participants had to remember the sequence of digits presented. On a final frame displayed for 3.5 s, two digit strings were
presented: one containing the correct ordering of the digits from the previous four frames and one containing an incorrect ordering generated by swapping
two of the digits in the sequence. Participants selected the string with the correct ordering. A block contained two trials of the same condition (18 s), and a run
contained 20 blocks plus four 18-s rest periods (432 s total for a run). Each subject participated in two runs.
saccade task
800 ms
800 ms
800 ms24 saccades
per block
800 ms
...
20 s
fixation
...
Fig. S2. Eye movement task. To identify responses related to eye movements, we used a saccade task adapted from the work by Amiez et al. (54). Participants
were cued to perform the saccade task with a 2-s text cue (“follow the fixation cross”) and then, saw a 1-s blank screen. Subjects then saw a series of 800-ms
frames, in which the fixation cross appeared in one of three locations: the center of the screen or 8.4° to the left or right of center. The position of the fixation
cross was chosen randomly on each frame subject to the constraint that it appeared eight times in each of the left and right sides of the screen and nine times
in the center over the course of 25 frames. Subjects had to make a saccade to the new location of the fixation cross as quickly as possible each time that its
location changed. A block ended with a 3-s period when a static fixation cross was displayed in the center of the screen, making 26-s blocks. In separate rest
blocks, also 26 s, the text cue read “fixate the cross,” and the fixation cross remained in the center of the screen for the duration of the block. Four blocks each
of the saccade condition and the rest condition were presented within a run. Runs also contained blocks of another motor localizer task not analyzed for this
study. A full run lasted 416 s. Five subjects who also participated in experiments 1 and 2 participated in the eye movement task, and each subject completed
two runs.
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Fig. S3. Eye movements cannot account for responses within the candidate physics regions. Within five candidate physics regions identified in experiments
1 and 2, we compared the responses to the physics tasks with those from the eye movement task described in Fig. S2. PSC for the three tasks is shown here, and
it was computed based on five subjects who completed the eye movement task. Although eye movement responses were significant in these areas (t4 = 6.67;
P = 0.0026; one-sample t test on eye movement PSCs averaged across areas), the response to the physical inference conditions from experiments 1 and 2 was
significantly larger than that to saccades (t4 = 7.65; P = 0.0016 for experiment 1 physics vs. eye movements; t4 = 10.61; P = 0.00045 for experiment 2 physics vs.
eye movements; paired t tests on PSC values averaged across five areas). These data rule out the possibility that any differential eye movements between
conditions in the physics tasks could have driven the physics-related responses: the physics stimuli produced larger responses than even a saccade-based lo-
calizer designed specifically to maximize the BOLD response related to eye movements.
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